Switzerland is in the process of making far-reaching changes to the surveillance of communications... without a popular vote, without a proper parliamentary debate, and almost without anyone noticing. Under the guise of ’technical adjustments«, ordinances are extending the collection and retention of data concerning the entire population. What is at stake here is neither legal detail nor simple public security: it is a silent challenge to the right to privacy, to the secrecy of communications and to constitutional safeguards. If this subject seems abstract to you, it is precisely because it is already becoming concrete.
This analysis does not come from an activist, but from a senior police officer in a French-speaking canton of Switzerland, who has chosen to remain anonymous in order to draw attention to the silent excesses of surveillance in Switzerland.
Switzerland has a specific legal framework for monitoring communications with the Federal law on the surveillance of correspondence by post and telecommunications (LSCPT). Adopted in 2000 and subsequently revised several times, this law had a clear objective: to guarantee security while respecting privacy.
However, since 2019 - and especially through the ordinances that came into force in 2024 and will be revised in 2025 - this balance has been upset.
«Freedom is the right to do whatever the laws allow.» - Montesquieu
A fast-track reform, outside the democratic debate
A few dates are enough to understand the institutional drift:
- 22 March 2019 Extending surveillance obligations to digital service providers.
- 1st January 2024 entry into force of technical ordinances (OSCPT, OME-SCPT) extending data collection in concrete terms.
- 29 January 2025 Public consultation for a new extension, without a fundamental revision of the law.
- 10 December 2025 The Council of States imposes a complete review (motion 25.4273) in the face of massive criticism.
The problem is not technological adaptation.
The problem is the method Major political choices made by decree, without a law, without a thorough parliamentary debate, without a popular decision.
«Important rules affecting fundamental rights must be enacted in the form of a law.» - Article 164, Federal Constitution
What the new ordinances really change
Under the guise of «technical clarifications», the so-called partial revision introduces substantial changes:
- Extension of obligations to many digital services depending on their size or audience.
- New data collected: cross-identification of users, last accesses to services, retrospective analyses.
- Real-time monitoring of metadata, independently of a targeted survey.
- Obligation to remove certain encryptions applied by suppliers.
- General retention of metadata for six months for the entire population.
It's no longer a question of targeted survey tools, but of setting up a permanent surveillance infrastructure.
Privacy: a structural breach
The consequences are far-reaching and systemic:
- Detailed profiling of social relationships, travel and communication habits.
- Increased risk of data leaks, abuse and cyber-attacks.
- Direct attack on professional secrets (journalists, lawyers, doctors).
- Breach of trust between citizens and service providers.
- Disproportionate pressure on SMEs and innovation.
As the European Court of Human Rights has pointed out :
«Widespread secret surveillance is incompatible with the rule of law.» - ECHR case law, principle of proportionality
The investment freeze and partial relocation of Proton outside Switzerland already illustrate the practical effects of this legal uncertainty.
A direct contradiction with the Constitution and European law
L’Article 13 of the Federal Constitution explicitly guarantees :
«The right to respect for private and family life and the secrecy of correspondence and telecommunications.»
However, the blanket retention of data concerning the entire population, without individual suspicion, violates the principles of necessity, of proportionality and purpose.
Paradoxically, Switzerland finds itself with a more intrusive regime than that resulting from the RGPD and the EU ePrivacy Directive - at the risk of exposing the Confederation to condemnation before the ECHR.
Conclusion: a democratic red line
Safety does not justify everything.
By extending surveillance by decree, without a clear mandate from the legislature or the people, the federal state is weakening the freedoms it claims to defend.
The motion adopted in December 2025 offers a rare opportunity to correct this drift. But it must be seized.
«A state that monitors everything ends up protecting nothing.»
The question is not a technical one.
It is constitutional, democratic and civilisational.
We analyse what the media keep quiet. What Berne negotiates, we dissect. Join our HQ on Telegram now: https://t.me/swisssovereignty